Introduction
As part of its response to the ongoing credit crisis, the federal government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-chartered, privately owned mortgage finance companies, in conservatorship. These two massive companies are profit-driven, but as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) they also have a government-mandated mission to provide liquidity and stability to the United States mortgage market and to achieve certain affordable housing goals. How the two companies should exit their conservatorship is of key importance to the future of federal housing finance policy. Indeed, this question is of pressing importance as the Obama Administration has signaled that it would rely heavily on Fannie and Freddie as part of the short-term response to the foreclosure epidemic that has swept across America in the last couple of years. Once the acute crisis is dealt with, however, the Administration will need to put American housing finance policy on the right track for the long-term health of the system. This will require a framework for analyzing the needs of that system, a framework that this chapter provides.
Fannie and Freddie are extraordinarily large companies: together, they own or guarantee more than 40 percent of all the residential mortgages in the United States. This amounts to over $5.4 trillion in mortgages. By statute, Fannie and Freddie's operations are limited to the "conforming" portion of the mortgage market, which is made up of mortgages that do not exceed an annually adjusted threshold ($417,000 in 2009 and significantly higher in high-cost areas). The two companies effectively have no competition in the conforming sector of the mortgage market because of advantages granted to them by the federal government in their charters. The most significant of these advantages has been the federal government's implied guarantee of Fannie and Freddie's debt obligations. The implied guarantee allowed Fannie and Freddie to borrow funds more cheaply than their fully private competitors and thereby offer the most attractive pricing in the conforming market. As the two companies grew and grew, numerous commentators and government officials called for their reform. Fannie and Freddie's powerful lobbying forces, however, had kept these reformers mostly at bay until they entered conservatorship.
As a result, Fannie and Freddie continued to grow at a rapid rate through the early 2000s, until they were each hit by accounting scandals. In response to those scandals, Congress and the two companies' regulators began to take various steps to limit their growth. But once they stabilized in 2007, the current credit crisis commenced and their market share began to increase once again as other lenders could not raise capital to lend to borrowers. At first, many commentators believed that Fannie and Freddie would ride the crisis relatively unscathed, but it turned out that they had much more exposure to the problems in the toxic subprime and Alt-A portions of the mortgage market than they had let on in their public disclosures.
Because of their poor underwriting, the two companies started posting quarterly losses in 2007 that ran into the billions of dollars, with larger losses on the horizon. As a result, they were having trouble complying with the capital requirements set by their regulator. Their problems began to spiral out of control along with those of the rest of the financial sector until then-Secretary of the Treasury, Henry M. Paulson. Jr., asked that Congress give the Treasury the authority to take over the two companies if they were not able to meet their financial obligations. Congress, with remarkable alacrity, passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (the Act) in the summer of 2008. Soon thereafter, Paulson decided that the two companies were flirting with insolvency and placed them in conservatorship, pursuant to the Act.
While the American taxpayer will likely be required to fund a bailout of the two companies that will be measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars, the current state of affairs presents an opportunity to reform the two companies and the manner in which the mortgage market is structured. Though the need for reform is evident, few scholars have considered the issue systematically. Scholars have, however, built up a significant base of knowledge about what works well and what does not work well with public/ private hybrids like Fannie and Freddie.
